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C
ompanies have long used various perfor-
mance measures to quantify their results.
Public companies use quarterly and annual
net income, operating income, and earnings
per share to summarize their results for the
past period, and these are widely reported in the busi-
ness press.1 Measures of financial performance are
dubbed “lagging indicators” because they reflect the
results of the prior period. But in today’s fast-paced
global economy, many companies focus on leading indi-
cators as well. When appropriately identified, measured,
reported, and evaluated, leading indicators can inform
management of the progress being made on initiatives
undertaken to achieve higher profits.
Leading indicators are not a new phenomenon. For
example, the variances computed with standard cost
systems have traditionally provided managers with
timely information on production inefficiencies, allow-
ing them to focus their attention on unfavorable out-
comes, to take corrective action, and to improve profits. 
Tracking
Performance: 
When Less Is More
TRACKING TOO MANY PERFORMANCE MEASURES AT ONCE MAY CAUSE MANAGERS TO
LOSE SIGHT OF WHICH ONES CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. 
HAVING EMPLOYEES FOCUS ONLY ON THE KEY LEADING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
HELPS COMPANIES ACHIEVE BETTER RESULTS AND INCREASED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE.
B Y K A T H Y A .  P A U L S O N G J E R D E ,  P H . D . ,  A N D
S U S A N B .  H U G H E S ,  P H . D . ,  C P A
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY With or without a balanced scorecard, it is easy for managers to become inundated with met-
rics and measures. In this article, we first highlight the differences between lagging and leading measures. Second, we
illustrate the importance of differentiating the strategic leading indicators—the key leading measures—from those
that may improve operational efficiency without significant improvements in profitability. Third, we use a business
simulation to demonstrate that focusing on and improving the key leading measures has the greatest impact on prof-
itability, but getting lost in the secondary measures dilutes the effect. Combined, the results illustrate that less may be
more when it comes to measuring performance.
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Since the early 1990s, many companies have devel-
oped balanced scorecards to link their strategic objec-
tives, financial performance, and metrics associated with
initiatives related to customers, internal business
processes, and learning and growth. Many of the met-
rics associated with these last three categories are lead-
ing indicators. Favorable performance on these metrics
is expected to lead to more favorable financial perfor-
mance in the future.
In describing the balanced scorecard, Robert S.
Kaplan and David P. Norton suggest it should include
20 to 25 measures. They break this total down into five
financial, five customer, eight to 10 internal, and five
learning and growth measures.2 While upper manage-
ment may find it possible to track and evaluate that
many measures, those in distinct operating locations—
such as individual stores, warehouses, and restaurants—
may lose sight of the goal as they juggle their
operation’s performance to meet these various targets.
In fact, a 1998 report indicated that 70% of scorecard
implementations fail.3 Too many metrics and too much
reliance on historic financial measures prevent the bal-
anced scorecard implementation from adding value to
the firm.4 It is no surprise that a 2004 study of success-
ful scorecards found that the effective scorecards
included only a limited number of metrics at the top,
with supporting metrics listed below.
Companies that have not developed balanced score-
cards track their performance using a variety of mea-
sures. In fact, there is some evidence that these
companies may track a great number of measures to
assess their performance. Think about your own firm.
Whether or not you use a balanced scorecard, identify
how many measures you track on at least a monthly
basis—either because you believe they are important
or because someone else believes they are important.
Is it less than five? Less than 25? More than 50? Even
in firms that use a balanced scorecard to assess perfor-
mance, managers may find themselves evaluating per-
formance on more than 15 measures. With or without
the balanced scorecard framework, it is easy for man-
agers to become overwhelmed when trying to improve
a variety of measures or get frustrated when improving
performance on one measure results in lower perfor-
mance on another, at least in the short term. Given the
trade-offs involved in managing the results of multiple
measures, managers can easily lose sight of those mea-
sures that link directly to strategic objectives and
those that may have less long-term significance.
IDENTIFYING KEY INDICATORS
In a typical balanced scorecard, the four focus areas of
financial, customer, internal business process, and learn-
ing and growth are usually found from top to bottom on
the left-hand side. Initiatives (these may also be called
objectives) for each area are found in the next column
to the right. The initiatives identify actions (for exam-
ple, hire additional line supervisors, secure new suppli-
er) or goals (increase market by 5%, decrease rate of
absenteeism by 10%) that managers are expected to
achieve. Financial measures are lag measures. Initia-
tives in the other three areas are designed to lead to
improved financial performance. As such, achieving
these initiatives leads to improvements in future finan-
cial performance. Within some scorecards, the customer,
process, and learning and growth may be assessed with
what are termed lead and lag measures. Within this con-
text, achieving the goal of a lead measure indicates that
the initiative is on track, and achieving the goal of a lag
measure indicates that the goal has been accomplished.
For those readers unfamiliar with the layout of a bal-
anced scorecard, an example can be found in “How
Groups Produce Higher-Quality Balanced Scorecards
than Individuals” in the Summer 2005 issue of Manage-
ment Accounting Quarterly.5
While all of the customer, process, and learning and
growth initiatives may seem to be tied to long-term
strategic objectives, some items may be tied more
directly so are more significant than others. One way to
identify these key lead measures is to find those that
are directly associated with many different areas of the
balanced scorecard.6 Figure 1 illustrates this relation-
ship using objectives included in the scorecard from
the Summer 2005 article. The top panel shows reduc-
ing the employee turnover rate directly impacts only
initiatives in learning and growth. While important, this
objective does not have broad impact. A different out-
come is found if the company focuses on new product
development. Here, achieving the objective results in
direct improvements in all four areas of the balanced
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Figure 1: Distinguishing Between PI and KPI 
in a Balanced Scorecard
Financial
X
Customer
X
Internal Business Processes
X
Learning and Growth
Employee training and 
advancement
Financial
Double sales
Customer
Brands that are marketplace 
leaders
Internal Business Processes
Number of new products 
under development
Learning and Growth
Awareness of core values
Employee 
Turnover Rate
Measure 
of operating 
efficiency
Leads to
strategic 
goal
If the performance
indicator (PI) is
New Product
Development
If the key performance 
indicator (KPI) is
              
4M A N A G E M E N T  A C C O U N T I N G  Q U A R T E R L Y F A L L  2 0 0 7 ,  V O L .  9 ,  N O .  1
scorecard. So while reducing employee turnover is not
a key lead measure, the rate of new product develop-
ment is a key lead indicator. If it is identified as a key
lead indicator, managers will know to focus on this
objective while not harming that of employee turnover.
Another way to identify key lead indicators is to
identify the measures that you accumulate frequently
and that result either in achieving strategic objectives or
changing strategic objectives. Measures that you track
only quarterly or annually cannot be key lead perfor-
mance indicators. They don’t provide timely informa-
tion or allow for corrective action.7
Research on company performance and performance
measurement provides insight into possible key lead
measures. For example, a recent research study found
that managers in nonmanufacturing firms achieved
higher performance when they focused on employee
and operational factors to build human capital.8 These
findings suggest that key lead measures in nonmanufac-
turing firms are those associated with investment in
human capital.
Recent research also supports the idea that less is
more when it comes to the number of measures used to
track performance. The results of a recent survey of
members of the Institute of Management Accountants
(IMA®), found that managers who worked with less
complex measurement systems—defined as having 10
or fewer measurements—had reduced role conflict as
compared with managers who worked with more com-
plex systems.9 Reduced role conflict should result in
more efficient and focused managers and increased job
satisfaction. As such, identifying the key lead metrics
should help focus management’s attention on those
items most closely linked to the company’s strategic
objectives and should improve the manager’s job perfor-
mance and satisfaction, creating a win-win situation for
the company and the manager.
Home Depot and Starbucks are two widely recog-
nized U.S. companies that were in the news during the
first half of 2007. Their stories illustrate that tracking
too many measures not tied directly to a company’s
strategic objectives results in less-than-desired financial
results. The experiences of Steak n Shake, however,
show how the identification of the right lead metrics
results in improved performance.
Home Depot
Robert Nardelli came on board as the new CEO of
Home Depot in 2000.10 At the time, the company faced
a number of financial and operational problems that
needed to be addressed to ensure its long-run prof-
itability following 20 years of growth. At the store level,
managers had considerable autonomy to respond to
local market conditions, but this often translated into
managers ignoring directives from headquarters. This
entrepreneurial spirit also resulted in managers focusing
on increasing their individual store sales at any cost,
negatively impacting margins. Nardelli replaced the
sense of “entitled autonomy” in the organization with a
set of common objectives, goals, and metrics, and his
efforts paid off as earnings per share doubled between
2000 and 2005.
But that is not the end of the story. As management
focused on all aspects of a store’s productivity, customer
service began to slip. Time spent measuring items rang-
ing from how many pallets were removed from a truck
per hour to how many extended warranties each
employee sold per week translated into less time spent
assisting customers. As result, sales began to slip. On
January 2, 2007, Nardelli resigned as CEO and was
replaced by Frank Blake, who made improving cus-
tomer service a top priority.11
The Home Depot experience illustrates that a dis-
connect may develop over time between the organiza-
tion’s strategic objectives and its measurement system.
Figure 2 shows that focusing on store productivity may
have improved internal business processes, but it failed
to improve the customer experience and sales revenue.
A focus on the key leading indicators that improved the
customer experience might have led to different results.
Starbucks
Starbucks was ranked first in customer loyalty in the
coffee-and-doughnuts category for the five years prior
to 2007. In 2007, Dunkin’ Donuts took that ranking.12
In a February 2007 internal memo, Starbucks Chairman
Howard Schultz wrote, “…we have had to make a
series of decisions that, in retrospect, have led to the
watering down of the Starbucks experience, and what
some might call the commoditization of our brand.” In
his memo, Schultz identified four changes that were
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done to improve service, speed, and efficiency: the use
of automatic espresso machines; moving the beverage
production out of sight of the purchaser; limiting the
time the customer spent with the barista; and the use of
bagged rather than in-store roasted coffee. The focus on
increased efficiency interfered with the customer’s pur-
chase experience, negatively impacting ROI instead of
improving it. Figure 3 illustrates that a focus on internal
business processes resulted in negative impacts on the
customer experience and satisfaction, a critical compo-
nent in driving Starbucks’ demand and revenues.
Steak n Shake
A different set of measures was identified by the Steak
n Shake Company. Steak n Shake is a restaurant chain
that built a niche between quick-serve restaurants (for
example, McDonald’s) and casual dining (TGI
Friday’s). For many years, Steak n Shake recognized
that appropriate levels of well-trained employees lead
to more satisfied customers who generate larger rev-
enue per customer order and more repeat business. In
turn, satisfied customers lead to higher employee
retention levels, in turn reinforcing customer
satisfaction.
To increase customer satisfaction and revenues,
Steak n Shake focused on three key lead metrics identi-
fied through internal and external research. The mea-
sures were identified as those that drive individual
restaurant performance: associate turnover, drive-thru-
window service times, and dine-in customer satisfac-
tion. Each of the factors is an ideal key lead indicator
because it can be measured frequently, thereby provid-
ing timely feedback on performance leading to future
sales and profitability.13
Figure 2: Disconnect Between Strategy and Measurement 
at Home Depot
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IDENTIFYING KEY LEAD
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
In each of the three company examples, management
recognized the importance of establishing performance
metrics, but each had different degrees of success iden-
tifying the true key lead indicators.14 Identifying the
causal relationships among various metrics allows man-
agement to distinguish between key lead measures and
those measures that exert lesser impact on profitability.
But even in a simple environment, clearly defining
all of the interdependencies inherent in managing dif-
ferent measures is difficult. Working with a business
simulation allows managers to develop insight into key
lead measures and their impact on other measures.
Unlike actual business experiences, the simulation may
take less than one hour per cycle. Early failures do not
impact either the actual company’s profitability or the
manager’s incentive compensation, and participants can
quickly observe how concentrating on some measures
may result in short-term improvements but fail to
achieve long-term success.
The interactive simulation game Building Service,
Driving Profits is designed to help users develop their
ability to manage service organizations.15 In the simula-
tion, users work to understand how to manage human
resources in a customer-oriented service industry.16
Users manage RGP Financial Services, a fictional firm,
over a 10-year period. The goal is to reverse the vicious
cycle of downward performance trends by indentifying
the key lead metrics and then developing a coordinated
human resources strategy. The seven possible metrics,
presented in the form of levers, are:
u Incremental hiring;
u Layoffs;
u Starting salary; 
u Salary change;
u Training; 
u Service infrastructure (annual investment in com-
puters, software, phone systems); and
u Promotion (marketing) expense.
Figure 3: Measurement at Starbucks
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Although the effects of a particular strategy on vari-
ous financial and nonfinancial measures can be
observed after every year, emphasis is placed on moni-
toring three dashboard metrics (customer satisfaction,
employee satisfaction, and the cash index) through the
use of gauges. These metrics serve as the lag indicators
in the simulation. The control panel of the game, high-
lighting the seven levers and the three dashboard met-
rics, is illustrated in Figure 4.
While the control panel does not differentiate
between the levers, it is important to recognize that not
all of the seven initiatives are of equal importance. In
fact, after playing the game for a short time, it becomes
clear that only two levers truly drive success. Given the
service setting of this game, the key lead indicators are
investment in training and service infrastructure. While
the remaining five levers have the power to affect the
magnitude of the success achieved by the company,
they are not sufficient in and of themselves to reverse
the downward spiral of the company. Only the invest-
ment in training and service infrastructure lead to sig-
nificant improvement in the three lag indicators of cus-
tomer satisfaction, the cash index, and employee
satisfaction.
A typical winning strategy might start with a salary
increase, which not only increases current employee
satisfaction but may also attract higher-quality new
employees. Salary increases, however, represent a short-
term solution to the problem. To truly reverse the
vicious cycle, the organization must also invest substan-
tially in training and infrastructure to increase the aver-
age skill level of employees. Given the organization’s
precarious financial position, the investment in infra-
structure must be modest at first. As employee and cus-
tomer satisfaction begin to rise, the key to success is to
ramp up the investment in infrastructure, simultaneous-
ly spending generously on advertising to get the word
out that service levels have improved. Figure 5 illus-
trates the trajectory for employee satisfaction, customer
satisfaction, and profit under such a complete strategy.
Underlying this strategy’s success is a reinforcing
feedback loop between employee and customer satis-
Figure 4: Building Service, Driving Profit Control Panel
Source: Building Service, Driving Profit, Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, Mass., 1996.
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Figure 5: Complete Strategy
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faction. As employee satisfaction increases, employees
provide better service, which drives up customer satis-
faction. Satisfied customers, in turn, cause employees to
feel more satisfied with their work, thus starting the
cycle over again. There is another reinforcing loop at
work here as well. As customer satisfaction increases,
the size of the customer base increases. This leads to an
increase in revenue, which allows increased investment
in infrastructure. Improved infrastructure increases the
perceived quality of the service, yielding an additional
increase in customer satisfaction. Thus, understanding
the underlying relationship between a few key metrics
is important in designing an effective strategy.
To see the critical role that investment in training
and service infrastructure plays within the overall strate-
gy, consider what happens when the level of invest-
ment is scaled back but the rest of the strategy remains
the same. As illustrated in Figure 6, employee and cus-
tomer satisfaction dip in the short run, then experience
a modest increase. This pattern is similar to that
observed in Figure 5. In the long run, however, the tra-
jectories of employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction,
and profit are vastly different in the case of no training
and infrastructure investment vs. substantial invest-
ment. With insufficient investment, employee and cus-
tomer satisfaction eventually plunge, resulting in
persistent financial losses and the firing of the “manag-
er” before the end of the 10-year period.
What happens if the manager focuses solely on train-
ing and infrastructure investments? Would such a strate-
gy be sufficient to ensure success? The answer is a
qualified yes. As seen in Figure 7, relying solely on
training and infrastructure investments results in mod-
est financial success. Comparing Figure 7 to Figure 5,
however, clearly reveals that this success can be
improved upon greatly by coordinating the remaining
levers.
Thus, all levers, as in all metrics, are not created
equal. Focus on the wrong lever, and you may get
burned—as seen in the simulation game and in the cas-
es of Starbucks and Home Depot. Focus on the right
lever, and you may ensure your survival. In order to
find the true key performance metrics, you must first
have a clear understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms that tie the metrics together.
LESS IS MORE
Companies often use a variety of measures to help
them determine if they are on track to achieve fore-
casts, but too many measures may distract employees
from the actual goal. Home Depot’s recent experience
illustrates how the focus can be lost. Rather than focus
on the customer experience and how that generates
revenue, one metric focused on the speed with which
pallets could be unloaded. From a cost-control stand-
point, this may be important. Unfortunately, this mea-
sure does not lead to increased sales per customer, an
increase in the number of repeat customers, or addition-
al customers gained through positive referrals.
“You get what you measure” is a common idea in
business performance. When companies use many dif-
ferent measures, it is likely that employees lose sight of
the primary goal and work to achieve the goals of the
individual measures. What would that mean to our
highlighted companies? Home Depot employees could
work to unload a truck rather than help customers place
new purchases in their vehicles, Starbucks employees
could focus on how quickly they serve each customer in
line rather than enhance the customer experience, and
Steak n Shake workers could be distracted by in-store
politics rather than happily and efficiently serving cus-
tomers. In each location, the lack of customer service
would likely lead to reduced revenue from the cus-
tomer and the customer’s friends and family in the
future.
All three companies realized it is more efficient to
track a few key metrics that best indicate if they are
achieving the goal of increasing profitability rather than
track a variety of measures that may distract employees
from the true objective. How can other companies learn
from these experiences? First, even if a balanced score-
card approach with 20 to 25 measures is used to assess
strategic objectives, management may want to identify
the three to five lead measures that most drive revenue
and net income performance. Put simply, when com-
municating key metrics to employees, less is more.
Second, it is important that these measures are commu-
nicated clearly to all employees. Third, employees
should see the link between achieving the key lead
measures and their compensation. This was clear in the
Steak n Shake story. If the in-store dining experience is
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Figure 6: No Investment in Training and Infrastructure
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Figure 7: Investment in Training and Infrastructure Only
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positive, customers are likely to order more, leading to
higher tips for serving personnel. They are also likely to
return and to encourage their friends and family to visit
the restaurant, two more ways of increasing tips for ser-
vice personnel. Fourth, companies should work to
ensure that whatever metrics they use do not distract
employees from seeing the goal clearly—increasing rev-
enues, increasing income, and increasing positive cash
flow. n
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